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"FAIRER STILL THE WOODLANDS"
MAPPING THE FREE EXERCISE FOREST
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS. By Kent Greenawalt. 1
Princeton University Press. 2006. Pp. xi+ 455. $39.00.
John Witte, Jr. 2
A familiar hymn, still sung with gusto on many Sunday
mornings, has a couple of choice lines that came to mind as I
read Kent Greenawalt's latest masterwork: "Fair are the meadows, fairer still the woodlands.'' 3 Most souls brave enough to enter the First Amendment forest of religious liberty are more
likely to come out shouting "foul" than singing "fair." "Foul" in
the baseball sense because some of the Supreme Court's recent
cases applying the First Amendment establishment and free exercise clauses keep rolling wide of the right(s) baseline. "Foul"
in the olfactory sense because this First Amendment forest now
has the distinct aroma of founding principles of religious liberty
rotting from neglect and of novel doctrines of neutrality that just
don't smell right. And "foul" in the equitable sense because the
First Amendment religion clauses have been so weakened by recent Supreme Court cases that the protection of American religious liberty is falling increasingly to other legal provisions and
other branches of government. It is no small irony that today
Congress and state courts provide more religious liberty than the
federal courts, and that the First Amendment free speech clause
provides more protection for religious claimants than the First
Amendment free exercise clause.
Kent Greenawalt's projected two volume series on Religion
and the Constitution provides the reader with a clear map

1. University Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
2. Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of
Law and Religion. Emory University.
3. A line in the Silesian folk song, "Fairest Lord Jesus" viewed at hup:!lmy.
homewithgod.comlheavenlymidis2/fairest.html (August 15, 2007).
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through this dank First Amendment forest, and a cogent guide
to a fairer religious liberty jurisprudence. The first volume, subtitled ''Free Exercise and Fairness,'' is the book here under review. The second volume, on the establishment clause, is in the
works. This first volume is a free standing tome that can be read
without its companion. But it properly puts off some of the constitutional questions (involving issues like Sabbath law and religious tax exemptions) that implicate both free exercise and establishment clause questions. If the elegance and acuity of this
first volume are any indication, you would be wise to place an
advanced order for the second. These volumes are destined to
become standard research guides and teaching tools for religious
liberty scholars. students, and advocates alike.
The main purpose of this volume is to explore the many areas of free exercise law that have occupied federal (and sometimes state) courts, legislatures, and agencies-and to suggest reforms that will bring greater freedom, fairness, and firmness to
each of these areas of law. After a brief conceptual framing and
analysis of the history of the First Amendment religion clauses,
Greenawalt offers a score of chapters that take up various religious liberty issues, which are distilled a bit in a brief concluding
chapter. The issues include the claims of individuals to conscientious objections to military service, education, oath swearing,
medical procedures, and more; their claims to special constitutional protections for religious drug use, dress, ornamentation,
grooming, proselytism, Sabbath observance, sacred sites, child
custody, tithe payments, and others; and their calls for special religious rights and liberties within the military, prisons, hospitals,
public schools, government agencies, public forums, and private
workplaces and associations. Greenawalt also takes up the
claims of churches and other religious organizations to special
rules to associate and incorporate, to discriminate or propagate
their views on religious grounds, to protect their confidential
clerical communications, to resolve their own internal disputes
over property, to gain special protections in bankruptcy proceedings, and to receive tax exemptions, zoning privileges, and historic preservation immunities-and the limits on these and other
claims when religious associations, through their officials or
agents, engage in crimes, torts, or untoward conduct. This topical
organization of the chapters (and the detailed index) makes the
book valuable both as a reference for those interested in selected
topics of religious liberty, and as an overview of the field that
can be read cover to cover.
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Most of the chapters pose the legal problematic(s) at issue,
rehearse the relevant cases, statutes, and regulations on point,
and then offer a critical reading-sometimes concurring in,
sometimes dissenting from, often nuancing and urging improvements to the prevailing law and legal opinion on point. The book
ranges well beyond traditional First Amendment free exercise
issues heard by the Supreme Court. Greenawalt analyzes the full
range of freedoms of private parties to exercise their religious
beliefs, and the appropriate limits that may be imposed on this
exercise for the sake of health, safety, and welfare of the community or the fundamental rights of others. On a number of the
issues that have reached the Supreme Court, Greenawalt compares its opinions with those of lower federal and state courts,
enhancing the legal complexity of the issues and the range of
possibilities for their fairer resolution. The reader also gets a
vivid sense of many federal and state statutes and regulations
governing religion (dealing with laws of bankruptcy, health care,
workplace, construction, and the like) that, for better or worse,
have proceeded without much constitutional scrutiny so far.
Intermittently, Greenawalt pauses to introduce readers to
the key steps of pressing a prima facie free exercise case under
the First Amendment. Parties must not only meet the general
standing, case and controversy, ripeness, and political question
thresholds. They must also demonstrate their sincerity and good
faith, and the presence of a substantial burden that has been imposed on the exercise of their religion. Greenawalt traces the
shifting standards of review in different eras and areas of religious liberty law, and the ample problematics that confront
courts in balancing free exercise claims against government
power and balancing one party's religious rights assertions
against the private rights claims of others. He also explores
deeply the perennially contentious issues of legislatively and judicially created exemptions for religious claimants who meet
these prima facie requirements, coming out in favor of most of
them (pp. 27-34, 109-56, 201-32).
The book is written with elegance, power, and lucidity-and
filled with the kind of wit, wisdom, and Wissenschaft that
Greenawalt's readers have come to expect from his dozen earlier
tomes on the constitutional and philosophical foundations of
4
law, religion, and morality. Readers cannot help but see a keen
4. See. among his other volumes on this topic: KENT GREENAWALT. DOES Goo
BELONG IN SCHOOLS (2005): KENT GREENAWALT. PRIVATE CO!'<SCIENCES Al'<D
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intellectual and incisive teacher at work in these pages, who
knows just how to probe and push the law at propitious points,
and how to map out complicated arguments so all can understand what is at stake. He makes judicious use of the vast resources at hand. He picks selectively among the hundreds of
scholarly texts, addresses the main federal cases and statutes,
and introduces some interesting state cases and statutes (such as
those on snake handling, church tort liability, and child care and
custody disputes based on religion) that have not been enough
part of the mainstream of scholarship on religious liberty. And
while characteristically generous and genial in his treatment of
others, he does not flinch from dishing out firm rebukes and
withering criticisms of courts and commentators who have
strayed from the right path.
The right path of religious liberty, as Greenawalt sees it, is
that government must accommodate if not facilitate "the maximum expression of religious conviction that is consistent with a
commitment to fairness and the public welfare" Uacket). "I believe strongly in the major values that lie behind free exercise
and nonestablishment," he elaborates in a strong early passage
that sets the tone of the book.
People should be free to adopt religious beliefs and engage in
religious practices because that is one vital aspect of personal
autonomy, and because recognition of that freedom is more
conducive to social harmony in a modem society than any
other alternative. I believe, further, that most people experience some transcendent dimension in their lives and that, despite the unavailability of decisive evidence, that experience
reflects some objective reality. Whether the government
should involve itself in promoting religious values may be arguable, but my own view is that personal autonomy is most
fully recognized and the flourishing of religion itself is best
served if the government does not sponsor religious understandings and practices (pp. 3--4).

With such a robust view of religious liberty, Greenawalt is
predictably critical of those who dismiss religion as too "silly" to
worry about or too sinister to protect except perhaps as a peculiar private preoccupation. "A serious person trying to grapple with
the state's treatment of religion has to undertake a much more
arduous effort to distill the nature of our county's traditions and
PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); KENT GREENAWALT. CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY
(1987).

2007]

BOOK REVIEWS

555

of sound practice in modern political democracies" (p. 4; see also
pp. 124-56). Greenawalt is equally critical of those who would
wish to reduce the First Amendment religion clauses to simple
formulas such as "separation of church and state," "equal treatment," or "government neutrality" toward religion. Questions of
religious liberty are too complex to be judged by simple aphorisms or mechanical tests, he insists. They require a judicious
balancing of "multiple values," "principles," and "doctrines" at
once (pp. 5-9, 14-15)-not least the collection of religious liberty principles forged by the eighteenth-century founders: liberty
of conscience, freedom of exercise, religious equality, religious
pluralism, separation of church and state, and disestablishment
of religion (pp. 20-22). And Greenawalt is critical of those who
regard the free exercise clause as redundant of First Amendment
guarantees of free speech, press, and association and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection
(pp. 228-32, 387-95, 439-41). The Constitution declares that religion is a special category of liberty, he insists, and it deserves "a
core of undisputed protection" not available elsewhere in the
Constitution. "Neither the federal government nor states can interfere with religious belief or religious expression or with religious practice that causes no harm apart from its religious significance; no government can single out a religion for adverse
targeting ... ; no government can discriminate against one or
some religions in relation to other religions" (p. 440; see also pp.
15-25).
Constitutional scholars will not be surprised that
Greenawalt's criticisms of these reductionist approaches to religion and religious liberty lead him to rebuke the Supreme Court's
current reductionist free exercise law. In the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith,' the Court reduced the free exercise
guarantee to a type of heightened rational basis review. The
Smith Court held that laws that are judged to be "neutral and
generally applicable" will pass muster under the free exercise
clause, regardless of the burden cast on religion or the nature of
the power exercised by government. Even a law that crushes a
central belief or practice of a free exercise claimant will survive
constitutional challenge if it is neutrally drafted and generally
applicable to all. Only if the law is not neutrally drafted or generally applicable will government be required to demonstrate a
compelling government interest that overrides the burdened free
5.

Employment Div .. Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

556

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:551

6

exercise right. While he properly works hard to show that the
Smith test has not been entirely toothless, especially in the hands
of some able federal judges, Greenawalt is sharply critical of this
formulation of the free exercise guarantee. He views the Smith
test as "arbitrary," "puzzling," "anomalous," "based little on
original understanding" of the free exercise clause and more on
"jerry-rigged" arguments, "if not ex nihilo'' reasoning. For all its
facile distinctions of earlier precedents and its fictional talk of
"hybrid rights" exceptions, the Smith case is "a striking abandonment" of well-settled precedent and a "distressing" "Procrustean one-size-fits-all to the bewildering richness of religious
practice and convictions" (pp. 31-33, 75-83). It introduces a
"harsh, religion-blind" neutrality, and exposes a Court that "has
simply given up on protecting a wide range of free exercise rights
for religious minorities" and left them to seek whatever protections they can from legislators and state judges (pp. 79, 227).
Greenawalt calls for Smith to be reversed, the free exercise
clause to be restored, and the federal courts to be returned to serious protection of religious liberty for all- even those with exotic and unpopular beliefs and practices that now find rather little sympathy from legislators and state judges who tend to keep
their eyes on majoritarian sentiment and the next election.
Constitutional scholars will be at least a bit surprised, however, that Greenawalt does not embrace wholeheartedly the
"strict scrutiny" standard of free exercise review that Smith had
jettisoned. This standard requires government to prove a compelling state interest and the least restrictive alternative to
achieving that interest when a law or state action is challenged
under the free exercise clause. It also outlaws blatant religious
discrimination by government whether on the face of a statute or
in its application. This strict scrutiny standard had been earlier
7
introduced by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner (1963),
the "high water mark of free exercise" law (pp. 29, 177-83). It
became (in)famous among constitutional scholars after Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the case that exempted Amish children from
8
full compliance with mandatory school attendance laws. Strict
scrutiny had been the Court's standard of choice in ten free ex6. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (local ordinance transparently discriminating against ritual sacrifice of animals
violates the free exercise clause).
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise clause forbids state to
deny unemployment compensation to claimant discharged from a job that would require
her to work on her Sabbath).
8. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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9

ercise cases from 1963 to 1989. After Smith announced the neutrality standard in 1990, Congress reintroduced the strict scrutiny
standard in the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
10
(RFRA), adducing Sherbert and Yoder as its prototypes. In
1997, the Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states, but
11
left it standing as applied to Congress. Congress also introduced
this strict scrutiny standard in the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act (RLUIPAt and in several other discrete
federal statutes which apply to both federal and state govern13
ments. In 2005, a 9-0 Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA, and
lower federal courts have since upheld other federal statutes
with strict scrutiny standards. A number of states have adopted
this strict scrutiny standard test, too, in their state constitutional
and statutory laws on religious liberty- not least in the thirteen
state religious freedom restoration acts that have been issued in
the past decade. And, international laws on religious liberty, like
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which the United States is a signatory, have a form of strict scrutiny review, under the human rights standards of "necessity and
14
proportionality." So, with all this support for strict scrutiny to
protect free exercise rights, what gives Greenawalt pause?
Fairness is the short answer. While he agrees with the results of most federal and state cases that have used a strict scrutiny standard, Greenawalt finds that an uncritical application of
this standard may well hurt the cause of religious liberty more
than help it. Slavish application of this standard carries the risk
of "arbitrary decision and unjustified favoritism" for popular religions, and it often burdens courts with "undeniably difficult"
and "time consuming" tasks that can bring too little reward (p.
201). A strict scrutiny regime inevitably attracts many spurious if
not fraudulent claims by those with time on their hands, notably,
prisoners who file the majority of cases. It sometimes forces
judges to review closely not only the sincerity and good faith of
the free exercise claimant, but also the centrality of the belief or
9. The most recent was Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec .. 489 U.S. 829
(1989) (state may not deny unemployment benefits to claimant who refused to take a job
that might require him to work on Sunday).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (1993).
11. City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997).
12. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (1993).
13. Cutter v. Wilkinson. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
14. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI). U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16. 1966). See comparative analysis in a recent Symposium. The Foundations and Frontiers of Religious
Liberty: A 25th Anniversary Celebration of the 1981 UN Declaration on the Religious Tolerance. 21 EMORY lNT'L L. REV. 1-266 (2007).
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practice being burdened and the substantiality of the burden itself-inquiries which themselves can be deeply intrusive and injurious (pp. 109-56, 201-32). And, it must be remembered that
in free exercise law, strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact," as it has been in equal protection and free speech law
(p. 215, quoting Gerald Gunther). Even in the Sherbert and
Yoder heyday of 1963-1989, when the Supreme Court had strict
scrutiny as its stated free exercise standard, government won
nearly half the cases-and in four other free exercise cases in
that era, the Court simply used a different test and found for the
government each time." Similarly, in the early years of RFRA,
government won more than 80% of the time against RFRA
claimants. Still today, most RFRA and RLUIPA claimants lose,
a number of them now stumbling at the preliminary inquiry of
whether they even have a "substantial burden" on their free exercise rights. The strict scrutiny regime of free exercisewhether constitutional or statutory- has not been so unequivocally favorable to religious liberty as an uncritical reading might
suggest, Greenawalt concludes.
In what he calls the "most important chapter in the book"
(p. 8), Greenawalt thus presses for a more nuanced balancing
test between free exercise rights and government poweryielding what is effectively an "intermediate standard" of heightened scrutiny for free exercise cases (pp. 201-32). (This is a
standard that he would also apply as far as possible in resolving
clashes between religious claimants and other private parties
(pp. 326-76)). To deter unnecessary constitutional litigation,
Greenawalt calls for religious liberty litigants to weigh more
carefully the centrality of the belief and practice that is being
burdened, and to desist from making a federal case out of manageable or avoidable burdens on discretionary religious conduct.
He calls for government officials, in turn, to weigh more carefully the seriousness of the state power and program that is being
implemented, and to desist from intruding on religious beliefs
and practices that could easily be spared by taking a discretion15. See Goldman v. Weinberger. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military officer does not have
free exercise right to wear his yarmulke on duty contrary to military dress code); Bowen
v. Roy. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (agency's use of social security number does not violate free
exercise rights of Native American. who believes such use would impair his child's spirit):
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying free exercise accommodation
for Muslim prisoner to engage in collective Friday worship): Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass·n. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (construction of road through section of national forest regarded as sacred ground by three tribes does not violate free exercise
clause).
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ary step or two. Such mutual restraint and self-help by both
sides, he argues, will keep the court dockets free from so many
silly cases that have given the strict scrutiny standard such a bad
name and such a modest record of success. (If only constitutional
law had Rule 11-like sanctions and "frivolous litigation" penalties on both sides to make this aspiration for self-restraint stick.)
To streamline the federal litigation that should go forward even
after such self-restraint, Greenawalt calls on federal judges to
exercise greater deference in honoring sincere, good faith claims
that an "important" religious interest has been unduly burdened,
and to press legislatures to work harder to find less restrictive alternatives that minimize these burdens. And he calls for courts
to make judicious use of free exercise exemptions and immunities to remove the heaviest burdens on important religious interests that remain substantially burdened, despite everyone's best
efforts. "Although engaging in such an exercise is indeed troublesome for courts," he admits, "this is one of those domains of
law in which messiness at the edges, and uneven application" of
the law to accommodate the unusual are necessary to achieve
maximum fairness for all (p. 214).
Even if the balancing test can be fixed in this way,
Greenawalt seems reluctant to make the First Amendment free
exercise clause the only or even the principal forum for protecting the freedom of religious exercise (pp. 228-32, 387-93, 43943). One of the ironies of the Smith case is that it has aided the
cause of religious liberty by pressing litigants and legislators to
look elsewhere in the Constitution for fuller and firmer protection-and with some notable successes. For example, despite
Smith, religious liberty litigants have continued to find ample
protection against religious discrimination under the First
Amendment free speech clause. 16 And they have used the free
speech, establishment, and equal protection clauses together to
create a whole series of precedents that grant religious parties
equal access to government facilities, forums, and even funds
made available to like-positioned non-religious parties. 17 All
16. See most recently. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y.. Inc. v. Village of
Stratton. 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (village ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors and
canvassers to obtain a permit containing one's name violates constitutional free speech
and free exercise rights because of its breadth and unprecedented nature. and is not narrowly enough tailored to the stated interest of preventing fraud. crime. and privacy intrusiOn).
17. See the series of cases from Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (when a
state university creates a limited public forum open to voluntary student groups. religious
groups must be given "equal access" to that forum) to Good News Club v. Milford Cen-
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these are religious liberty byproducts of the new clause shopping
catalyzed by Smith (pp. 228-38, 243-45, 440-43). These kinds of
protections had not been much part of the strict scrutiny free exercise law before Smith. 1H It's a legitimate question, which
Greenwalt leaves dangling, what a more rigorous and judiciously
applied free exercise standard might do to these important lines
of cases-subsume them, eclipse them, or reject them?
Greenawalt also leaves dangling the question-no doubt to
be tied down firmly in the next volume on the establishment
clause-whether statutory protections of religious liberty are ultimately adequate or even constitutional. In nearly two hundred
separate pieces of federal legislation issued since the 1990 Smith
case, Congress has built in new special exemptions, privileges,
immunities, benefits, and treatments for religious parties. 19 These
include not only the loudly orchestrated enactments of RFRA
and RLUIPA or the recent tweaks to the familiar 501(c)(3) income tax exemptions for religious groups. They include the quite
visible- and for some quite risible- International Religious
Freedom Act (1998) and the various new laws on faith-based initiatives. But beyond these, largely unnoticed by the public and
largely unchecked by the courts is a sprawling network of special
religious rights that have been quietly stitched into federal laws
governing all manner of subjects -laws of evidence and civil
procedure, disability, labor, employment, unions, civil rights, interstate commerce, bankruptcy, ERISA, workplace, military,
immigration and naturalization, food and drugs, prisons, hospitals, land use, and much more. And federal laws are only part of
this network. State, county, city, and village laws creating special
religious rights for some of these same topics, as well as for local
issues like property tax, zoning, non-profit organizations, education, charity, and the like can number in the thousandsparticularly in Bible Belt states.

tral Sch .. 533 U.S. 98 (2002) (a public middle school's exclusion of Christian children's
club from meeting on school property after hours was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. and was not required to avoid establishment of religion). But cf Locke v.
Davey. 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a state scholarship program established to assist
payment of academically-gifted students' post-secondary education expenses for all students. except those pursuing a theology degree).
18. The only cases are Widmar. 454 U.S. at 7. and indirectly McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978) (state constitutional prohibition against clergy holding political office
violates First Amendment rights).
19. See the recent series of articles by Diana B. Henriques, N.Y. TIMES. October 811. 2006.
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The Supreme Court has long viewed narrow and well targeted special religious rights provisions in legislation as suitable
accommodations of religion- that are neither mandated by the
20
free exercise clause nor prohibited by the establishment clause.
In recent years, the Court has further made clear that many of
these religious accommodation issues are for the legislatures, not
for the courts, to decide, and for the states and not for the federal government to put in place. This small explosion of religiously favorable legislation in the past two decades is part and
product of broader constitutional moves toward stronger separation of powers at the federal level, and stronger empowerment
of the states.
It will be intriguing to see how this new statutory matrix of
religious liberty will fare in Greenawalt's sequel volume on the
establishment of religion. The indications we get from this first
volume are that statutory accommodations of "important" religious interests-such as an individual's conscientious objections
to military service or a church's right to resolve its own disputes
or to discriminate on religious grounds in core religious employment decisions-are not only "fair" but "essential" for the
protection of religious liberty (pp. 49-67, 261-89, 377-95). But
tax exemptions, zoning privileges, bankruptcy priorities, evidentiary immunities and the like that touch on less essential religious interests may not be so important to religious liberty, at
least at the constitutional level. They might well have to yield to
other constitutional considerations, not least the constitutional
prohibition on religious establishment.
If all these separate pieces of protection- federal and state,
constitutional and statutory, procedural and remedial- are
viewed together, one cannot resist Greenawalt's overall conclusion that religious liberty is "fairer" today than is generally admitted by many constitutional scholars who have been preoccupied with Smith. The issue that remains is whether all this legal
complexity is necessary if the First Amendment free exercise
clause is strong, and whether it is not fairer to press for a strong

20. The earliest such holdings were Gibbons v. District of Columbia. 116 U.S. 404
(1886) (allowing property tax scheme that exempted "church buildings, and grounds actually occupied by such buildings"); Arver v. United States. 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding Congress's power to define conscientious objector status and Congress's restriction of
the status to ordained ministers. theology students. and members of well-recognized pacifist sects). Among recent cases. see especially Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of N.Y .. 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding state property tax exemption for church property against disestablishment clause challenge).
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federal free exercise clause rather than settle for a fair map
through a diffuse legal regime.
My own view is that free speech, equal protection, and
statutory protections of religious liberty cannot ultimately substitute for a more rigorous First Amendment free exercise clause.c 1
To be sure, the development of these doctrines post-Smith testifies both to the ingenuity of litigants and legislators and to the
flexibility of the constitutional process to accommodate the
pressing spiritual needs of citizens. And to be sure, the development of these doctrines has provided some religious minorities
with forms and forums of relief hitherto foreclosed to them.
These can only be temporary refuges for religious liberty,
however. Speech is only one form of religious exercise; equality
is only one principle that the free exercise clause protects. Even
generously defined, "speech" cannot embrace many forms of individual and corporate religious exercise- from the silent meditations of the sages to the noisy pilgrimages of the saints, from
the corporate consecration of the sanctuary to the ecclesiastical
discipline of the clergy. Even expansively interpreted, "equality"
cannot protect the special needs of religious individuals and religious groups. These needs were traditionally protected by the
principles of liberty of conscience and separation of church and
state and traditionally reflected in the exemptions and exclusions
countenanced and created by the free exercise clause.
Moreover, statutory provisions cannot permanently substitute for constitutional principles of free exercise. A statutory
scheme makes the protection of freedom of exercise considerably more fractured and chaotic than necessary-and notably uneven for groups whose religious claims are viewed with suspicion: Just ask Scientologists or Unification Church members
today. It also makes the protection of religious liberty too political. It is an elementary, but essential, political reality that statutes generally privilege the views of the majority, not the minority. They are passed by elected officials who must be as vigilant
in reflecting popular opinion as protecting constitutional imperatives. Too many of the recent federal statutes on religious liberty
are products of special lobbying by powerful majoritarian religious groups who tend to serve their own interests through these
exemptions, immunities, privileges, and earmarks. The free exercise clause, by contrast, is designed to protect the needs of the
21.

These next paragraphs are distilled from my book RELIGION AND THE
(2005). which provides detailed sources.

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
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minority as much as the majority. Its provisions are enforced by
appointed officials who must be more vigilant about protecting
constitutional imperatives than reflecting popular opinion. The
free exercise clause is designed to provide remedies for individuals and groups with insufficient political strength to have their
religious views or practices reflected in or protected by statutes.
Likewise, state laws on religious liberty can supplement, but
not substitute for federal laws. The growing shift in emphasis
from federal to state law leaves what should be common national
rights of religious liberty too vulnerable to fleeting political fashions and too contingent on a claimant's geographical location. In
my view, the federal courts should provide universal and firm religious liberty protections for all American parties, no matter
where they happen to reside or where they choose to file their
claim. This need for a universal law on religious liberty, in the
face of grim local bigotry at home and abroad, was among the
compelling reasons that led the Supreme Court in the 1940s to
"incorporate" the First Amendment religion clauses into the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and make them
binding on state and local governments. All those concerns over
local religious bigotry and prejudice remain painfully pertinent
today.
The original vision of the founders was that religion was
special and that it was deserving of special protection. The founders thus placed the free exercise clause alongside the free
speech, press, and assembly clauses to provide religious claimants with a special pathway to relief. Moreover, they put the free
exercise clause in creative tension with the establishment clause
to ensure that religious liberty received reciprocal protection.
The First Amendment free exercise clause outlaws government
proscriptions of religion-actions that unduly burden the conscience, restrict forms of religious exercise and expression, discriminate against religion, or invade the autonomy of churches
and other religious bodies. The First Amendment establishment
clause, in turn, outlaws government prescriptions of religionactions that unduly coerce the conscience, mandate forms of religious exercise and expression, discriminate in favor of religion,
or improperly ally the government with churches or other religious bodies. Both the free exercise and establishment clauses
thereby provide complementary protections to the first principles of religious liberty that the eighteenth-century American
founders championed -liberty of conscience, freedom of religious exercise and expression, equality of a plurality of faiths be-
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fore the law, separation of church and state, and no establishment of religion by law.
One need not necessarily endorse a jurisprudence of
originalism to embrace this multi-principled reading of the First
Amendment religion clauses. This was also the vision articulated
by the Supreme Court in the twin cases of Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) and Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 22 that
opened the modern era of the religious liberty. In both cases, the
Court worked hard to balance these basic founding principles of
religious liberty, and thereby to render the free exercise and establishment clauses complementary guarantees of religious liberty. In Cantwell, the Court effectively read each of these principles into the free exercise clause, as well as the free speech
clause as applied to religion. This First Amendment, Justice
Roberts wrote for the Cantwell Court, protects "[f]reedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization
or form of worship as the individual may choose." It "safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion," the "freedom to
act" on one's beliefs. It protects a "plurality of forms and expressions" of faith, each of which deserves equal protection under
the law. It ensures the "basic separation" of religious and political authorities and entities. For in "the realm of religious faith,
and in that of political belief," the Court wrote, "sharp differences arise."
But the people of this nation have ordained in light of history,
that, in spite of the probability of the excesses and abuses,
these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of the
democracy. The essential characteristic of these liberties is,
that under their shield many types of life, character, opinion
and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own country
23
for a people composed of many races and of many creeds.

Similarly, the Court in Everson v. Board of Education
(1947), despite using famously strong language on strict separation of church and state, struck a rather judicious balance among
these founding principles of religious liberty. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this." Justice Black wrote for the Everson court. No federal or
22. Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing
Twp .. 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
23. Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 303--04,310.
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state government (1) "can set up a church"-a violation of the
core disestablishment principle; (2) "can force or influence a
person to go or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion"- a violation of liberty of conscience; (3) can "punish [a person] for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance"- a violation of both liberty of
conscience and religious equality; or (4) "can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups,
or vice versa" -a violation of the principle of separation of
church and state. Justice Black also underscored the founders'
principle of religious pluralism and equality, declaring that government may not exclude "individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any faith, because of their faith, or lack
of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."
Liberty of conscience, freedom of exercise, religious equality, religious pluralism, separation of church and state, and no establishment of religion were all considered part of First Amend24
ment religious liberty in the Court's initial formulation.
In this first volume, Professor Greenawalt has done noble
service in calling the courts back to these founding principles of
religious liberty, demonstrating the continued utility of these
principles in original, hybrid, and novel forms, and in showing
concretely and copiously how a multi-principled religious liberty
jurisprudence can be applied to ensure a fairer law for all. I, for
one, can't wait for the next volume.

24.

Everson. 330 U.S. at 15-16.

